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CHAPTER I 
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The control function of management is the process of making sure 
the objectives of a company are achieved. In small business organiza­
tions this function can be performed by direct or face-to-face contact 
of management alone. However, in large and complex organizations en­
gaged in the manufacture of different products in plants spread over a 
wide geographical area, the informal system becomes inadequate. In such 
organizations, an effective information system is needed to provide con­
trol over the separate operating units. In recent years, increased 
attention has been directed toward placing separate operating units on 
a profit center basis, although other systems are frequently used. A 
profit center system provides a measure of performance which can be used 
by top management in controlling the resources of the organization or 
the operating unit. In some cases, it is hard to measure the profit of 
separate operating units because of the difficulty of measuring inter­
company sales or transfers, but by using a system of transfer pricing 
profit can be measured and business organizations can achieve the de­
sired control. 
I. THE STUDY 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study isg (l) to examine the methods of ac­
counting for transfers of products and services between separately 
1 
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organized units of a company (transfer pricing), so that the objectives 
of a profit center can be achieved, and (2) to investigate the applica­
tion of transfer pricing in a specific organization. 
Validation of the Study 
In stressing the validity of this study, it is necessary to show 
the advantage of a profit center in comparison to a commonly used con­
trol system—-an expense center. After this is substantiated, an explan­
ation will be presented showing how important transfer pricing methods 
are in establishing a profit center. 
In a profit center, a relationship is established between inputs 
(expenses) and outputs (revenues). In an expense center, the only con­
cern is with inputs, or the expenses incurred to produce the output. 
Thus, an expense center does not provide a measure of profitability as 
is accomplished by a profit center. For this reason, even though the 
expense center may be operating efficiently, it is not known whether or 
not the center is adequately contributing to the organization's profit. 
The system of information (the measurement of profit), supplied by a 
profit center, is therefore more extensive and provides a better con­
trol system. 
In many companies, growth has been accompanied by greater inte­
gration of operations. An integrated company is one which performs 
operations on more than one stage of the production of the product. In 
an integrated company, raw materials and products would be transferred 
from one operating unit to another, as successive manufacturing or mar­
keting steps are performed. This raises the problem of accounting for 
transfers between these units. In many cases, competitive market prices 
3 
cannot be used because they may not exist for items transferred between 
operating units. These items may be completely unique, or they may not 
lend themselves to outside sales, because they are used as components 
in another product. Therefore, in such cases, an approximation of a 
competitive price must be arrived at. Only when realistic transfer 
prices can be established is it possible to use divisional profit as a 
system of information in a control process. 
Limitations 
This study is designed to show transfer pricing methods and their 
usefulness in management control. The discussion will not consider the 
external consolidated financial reporting aspects of transfer pricing 
for stockholders and other third parties. If this were the case, trans­
fers would probably be priced at cost in order to reflect the stockhold­
ers® point of view. Stockholders view these transfers between operating 
units as just a movement of items, and any profit made on these transfers 
should not be included in the consolidated report. In the past, finan­
cial reporting considerations were often the determining factor in se*-
lecting a basis for pricing transfers. While this point of view may 
still exist in some companies, this study is not designed to consider 
this aspect. 
The present study was conducted to investigate the application of 
transfer pricing in a specific organization, and the conclusions are 
applicable only to the particular company studied. The discussion in 
National Association of Cost Accountants, Accounting for Intra-
company Transfers (Research Series No. 30? New York 2 The Macmillan 
Company, 1956), p. 21. 
u 
Chapter II will indicate that solutions to proper income measurement and 
suitable transfer pricing methods, can be explored only in context with 
specific organizational objectives. 
II. ORGANIZATION OF REMAINDER OP THE PAPER 
Chapter II consists of a review of decentralization and transfer 
pricing methods. The objectives of top management in a decentralized 
company are established first. Then divisional profit measurement and 
transfer pricing methods are examined as means of achieving decentralized 
objectives of a company. 
The first part of the case study is presented in Chapter III. 
The structure of the organization is described, and the existing control 
process is examined and evaluated. 
Chapter I? is devoted to investigating the application of transfer 
pricing in an operating unit of this company, so the objective of profit 
decentralization can be met. 
The study is summarized and the final conclusions are made in 
Chapter Y. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATTJRE 
In the past twenty years, the increased pressure by large com­
panies for more effective control tools has encouraged research and 
writing in the areas of decentralization and transfer pricing, both by 
educators and others who have studied or struggled with problems in 
these areas. The following is a review of these two related subjects. 
I. OBJECTIVE OF DECENTRALIZATION 
Delegation of Authority 
As companies have moved into new fields of operation accompanied 
by expanded product lines or wider sales regions, their organizational 
structure has changed. The centralized functional-type organization 
which so well fitted the single-product company has been replaced in many 
instances by divisionalization and decentralization. Divisionalization 
usually means grouping functions on a product or geographical basis into 
smaller organizational units« Decentralization results from the delega­
tion of certain chief executive responsibilities to managers of operating 
units.•*" 
In a centralized functional-type organization it is difficult for 
a single manufacturing executive to deal with all the different manufac-
%arold Stieglitz, "Patterns in Organization Structuring," Manage­
ment t A Book of Readings, Harold Koontz and Cyril O'iQonnell, editors 
(New York? McGraw-Hill Book Company, 196k), p. 188. 
5 
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taring problems associated with a variety of different products; and, 
likewise, it is difficult for the single sales manager to cope with all 
the problems associated with the sales of different products. It is 
even more difficult for one man, the chief executive, to assume respons­
ibility for the overall coordination of production, sales, and adminis­
tration of a complex business enterprise. This is what often occurs in 
a centralized, functional-type organization. Also, functional special­
ists tend to become too concerned about their own areas (and those alone). 
For example, the sales department might not be very conscious of its 
relationship to the manufacturing operation, or to total company profit 
performance. Cost may not become a prime consideration, as long as new 
services (such as the hiring of new salesmen) increases to some degree 
the perfection or importance of the sales function. 
In a decentralized company (which inherently includes divisional­
ization), coordination of functions is in the hands of people in the 
lower levels of the organization, who are closer to the actual problems. 
These people can make a decision with a better understanding of the pos­
sible implications of their action. By setting up smaller organizational 
units, the relationship between efficiency and functional perfection is 
also more readily apparent. In general, the objective of decentralization 
is to achieve the advantage of smallness for effective control and 
•> 
efficient operation. 
2 
Marshall K. Evans, "Accounting Problems in Measuring Performance 
by Organizational Units," National Association of Cost Accountants Bul­
letin, XTOI (August, 1955), 17U1. 
3lbid. 
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A decentralized company still needs control tools,, Without such 
tools, top management can not determine whether the performance of the 
manager to whom responsibility and authority have been delegated is 
satisfactory or unsatisfactory. One system which has been used to con­
trol decentralized authority is the profit center. 
Profit Center as a Control System for Decentralization 
A profit center is a serai-independent division headed by a man­
ager who is responsible for the coordination of functions relating to 
li 
the profit of the division. Thus, the division must have the necessary 
elements to generate a performance measure—a net profit. In other 
words, costs and revenues mast be both definable and measurable for the 
division. In general, profit measurement has three objectivess 
1. Main guide to evaluation—profit serves as the main guide to 
evaluation,of divisional management by top management, and 
the main guide by which the division manager makes his deci­
sions. 
2. Guide to goal agreement—profit should also link the goals 
of top management with the goals of the division managers so 
that each profit center, in maximizing its own profits, will 
do that which will maximize the profit of the entire company. 
3. Measure of profitability—divisional profit performance also 
Donald DeFrancesco, "The Accounting Side of Profit-Center 
Organization," Management Accounting, XLVTII (December, 1966), 56-57. 
For the purposes of this discussion the terms "profit center" and 
"division" will be used interchangeably hereafter,, 
^Gordon Shillinglaw, "Toward a Theory of Divisional Income 
Measurement," Accounting Review, XXXVII (April, 1962), 210. 
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serves as a guide in future resource allocation decisions. 
If divisional income is poor and efforts to increase it are 
• A 
unrewarding, then presumably future resources will be di­
verted to other areas. 
For a profit center to achieve these objectives, it is necessary 
to; 
1. Consider the assignment of responsibility. 
2. Consider the freedom to deal outside the company. 
3. Measure profit correctly. 
It. Establish sound transfer prices. 
The assignment of responsibility. Some businessmen argue that 
the profit center manager should be given complete responsibility for 
the coordination of functions relating to profit in order to make profit 
decentralization effective. Others feel there must be some broad re-
structions or policies set by top management, for if managers are left 
on their own, they will seek only to maximize their own profit and not 
that of the company in general. This reason stems from the fact that 
managers are evaluated by how successful they are within their "own 
divisions." 
As a guide, division managers must be held responsible for only 
that which they control. If a division manager is held accountable for 
the level of output, he must have full authority to determine that level. 
Likewise, unless he has full authority to make the decisions which affect 
profit maximization, he can not be expected to maximize profit. For 
instance, the interests of the company might be better served by having 
top management retain a portion of the authority to determine divisional 
9 
policies and make some decisions at the divisional level, but if this 
is the case, the responsibility of the division manager in maximizing 
6 
profit performance is also limited. 
It would be unwise to hold that one approach is right and the 
other wrong in all situations. The degree of responsibility can be 
based only upon the objective of top management through decentralization. 
The freedom to deal outside the company. Included in many discus­
sions on transfer pricing, is the idea that the selling (manufacturing) 
and buying divisions should treat each other as though they were inde­
pendent companies. This would require the manufacturing division to 
compete with other companies for sales to the buying division, and would 
give the buying division the right to decide which source will produce 
the item. John Dearden' feels that it is neither desirable nor practic­
able for divisions to treat each other as though they were independent 
companies. The cost of idle facilities would be considerable if the 
buying division placed its order outside the company. In analyzing who 
should decide which source will produce the item and how it should be 
priced, Mr. Dearden classifies all items sold within a company according 
to the possibility of buying them from an outside company. The cate­
gories are; 
A. Items that will probably never be produced by an outside 
supplier. 
^Lennis M. Knighton, "Transfer Pricing to Maximize Profit Objec­
tives," Business Topics, XIII (Autumn, 1965)* 73 = 
7 
'John Dearden, "Interdivisional Pricing," Management Control 
Systems, Robert M. Anthony, John Dearden and Richard F. Vancil, editors 
(Homewood, Illinoiss Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965), pp. 265-272. 
B. Items for which a change from manufacturing to buying or 
vice versa mast be made on a more or less long-term basis. 
C. Items for which the source may be changed on a short-terra 
basis. 
Because class A items will probably never be produced by an outside 
supplier, class B and G items only will be discussed,. 
Mr. Dearden concludes that the manufacturer of class B items, 
which require a substantial investment, should be determined by a cen­
tral staff group and any changes in sources of supply be made by matual 
agreement or arbitrated by the central group. Prices on these items, 
to promote efficiency, should be at current competitive levels, adjusted 
for any short-term abnormalities. If difficulty arises in determining 
competitive price, alternative transfer prices, which will be discussed 
8 
in the next major section of this chapter, can be used. 
In the case of class C items, which involve a relatively small 
investment of plant and equipment, the selling and buying divisions 
would together decide on who should produce the product. The prices on 
these items should be established and maintained on the basis of current 
competitive levels. The selling division would have the right to appeal 
to the central group if it feels that what the buying division wants to 
do is contrary to company interests. This would not be true, of course, 
9 
if the selling division cannot meet the current competitive price. 
In most situations, the ideal of letting the divisions have 
complete freedom to deal outside does not exist, but here again the 
8 9 
Ibid. Ibid. 
11 
determining factor is the company's objectives with respect to decen­
tralization and control. 
Measure profit correctly. A reliable measure of profit is also 
essential to achieve the objectives of a profit center. Two areas which 
mast be considered in profit measurement areg (1) allocation of the 
costs of company service units, and (2) determination of transfer prices. 
The allocation of the costs of company service units (such as 
home office, and research and development) to the divisions tends to be 
arbitrary. Some business firms feel the division manager has no control 
over these costs and should not be held responsible for them. Others 
feel they must be included to give an accurate profit figure. This 
point might be more significant, if comparisons on profit performance 
were to be made with similar outside companies. The profit figure of 
each division will differ depending on which approach is taken. If these 
costs are not allocated, the profit figures of the divisions will be 
higher than if they are allocated. 
The second area to consider in establishing a reliable measure 
of profit is the pricing of goods transferred between divisions (intra-
company transfers). Determining a price which will be fair to both 
divisions is vital because this price will be directly related to the 
profit of each division. Because of its importance, the establishment 
of a sound transfer price will be1 discussed in the following sections. 
Another aspect to consider in measuring profits correctly is 
that division managers will maximize that for which they are motivated. 
Therefore, top management must create an atmosphere and measure profits 
in such a way as to avoid placing too much emphasis on current profit 
12 
performance. Activities of the profit center must be directed so as to 
assure long-terra gains are not destroyed because of eagerness to earn 
short-term profits. This may require looking beyond the limits of profit 
reports by top management. It may consist of setting standards and goals 
for divisions to reach which involve a consideration of other activities, 
such as share of market, utilization of capacity, and improved production 
piethods."'"® Of course, the determining fact on correct profit measurement 
depends on the type of organization, the circumstances within which it 
operates, and the objective of top management in profit measurement or 
dec entralization. 
Establishing a sound transfer price. As mentioned earlier, the 
problem of transfer pricing is really part of the problem of measuring 
divisional profit correctly. Transfer pricing, or the determination of a 
proper valuation of goods transferred from one profit center to another, 
is probably the most difficult problem in income measurement for decen­
tralized operations? and it is for this reason that transfer pricing 
methods are so important. In appraisal of transfer pricing methods, the 
most important test is the extent to which the method promotes agreement 
between division and overall company goals. Without this consideration, 
the system will not promote efficient action among profit center managers 
11 
in maximizing company profit. 
II. ALTERNATIVE TRANSFER PRICING METHODS 
Prom the standpoint of profit measurement, there are two ideal 
profit centers. The first is one which sells and buys entirely outside 
^Knighton, op. cit., p. 75° UIbld, 
the company, having no transactions with other profit centers within the 
company. The other ideal profit center is one whose product is a compe­
titive good. This product has an established market price, as it is 
sold by many producers in the open market„ In both these cases, divi­
sional profit determination is relatively simple«, Regrettably, these 
two situations can only be classified as ideal cases, for many profit 
centers trade exclusively with other divisions in their own company, 
and the products which are transferred are those which do not have an 
established market price. Setting a value for the goods transferred 
from one center to another in these cases requires determining a suit­
able transfer price. In lieu of a competitive price, a market-based 
negotiated, or cost-based pricing method must be used* 
Market-based Prices 
A market-based transfer price is an estimate of what the actual 
price would be if the product were sold outside the company„ It is 
considered a fair price because it puts each profit center in the same 
position it would occupy if it were an independent company., Although 
there are probably many different methods used to estimate a market 
price, depending on the stage the product is in, one method which can 
be used by many companies is asking for bids, or price quotations from 
outside companies. 
In asking for bids, outside prospective suppliers mast know they 
will receive at least part of the business they are bidding on, if they 
outbid the division Mthin the company. In other words, these possible 
suppliers will not prepare a realistic bid for business they will not 
get, no matter what their bid„ In some cases, it might be a good practice 
Ik  
to give some of the business to the lowest outside bidder, even though 
12 
the division within the company was the low bidder. Without this 
consideration, this technique will not be successful in approximating 
competitive prices. 
In other instances, quoted prices by prospective outside suppliers 
may reflect (1) the desire to obtain an initial order, or (2) ignorance 
of cost. This price would tend to be temporary and not valid to use as 
13 
a transfer price for the manufacturing profit center. Thus, market-
price data obtained in this manner must be interpreted with sound 
judgment. 
Another method which could be used in setting an estimated market 
price is to adjust the market price of a product which is similar. With­
out adjusting this price it would be unfair to either the manufacturing 
or buying division, depending on whether the quality of the similar 
product was inferior or superior. For example, if the product were 
superior, the transfer price would be too high and the buying division 
would be paying too much for the product. 
A market price could also possibly be estimated for a product 
which is in some stage of its development. This price could be derived 
by subtracting from the price of the finished good, those costs (includ­
ing profits) added after the stage of development, on the product for 
which the transfer price is desired® 
12 
Robert Kf„ Anthony, "Notes on Transfer Pricing," Management Con­
trol Systems, op. cit., p0 259. 
•^National Association of Cost Accountants, Accounting for Intra-
company Transfers (Research Series No. 3O5 New Yorks The Macmillan Com­
pany, 1956), p. 26. 
15 
A market-based transfer price which is unstable in many cases is 
not a good transfer price. The manufacturing division will be trying 
to maximize its profits by making transfers when the transfer price is 
high, and the buying division will be trying to maximize profits by 
buying transfers when the price is low. The division with the most 
bargaining power will show a better profit, but action of this type 
(increasing profit at the expense of another division) will not neces-
1 ) 
sarily increase the entire company's profit. If the manufacturing 
division is required to transfer its product as soon as it is finished, 
this problem can be eliminated. But in this case, the division manager's 
control over profit performance would be limited. 
The availability and reliability of market-based prices vary 
widely in different circumstances, and as a consequence, they mast be 
interpreted and used with good judgment. 
negotiated Prices 
Negotiation is another method used to estimate a market price, 
but because of its significance it is discussed separately. A negotiated 
transfer price is set when managers of the concerned divisions meet in 
negotiation to determine a market price which is mutually acceptable,. 
This method seems fair in that it produces a price which the manufactur­
ing division could receive if it sold the product outside the company, 
but in certain instances it can be unsatisfactory. In the first place, 
when two divisions enter into negotiation, a considerable amount of time 
^Robert K. McLain, "Transfer Pricing Can Contribute to Divisional 
Performance Evaluation," National Association of Accountants Bulletin, 
XLI7 (August, 1963), 31. 
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might be spent before a price is agreed upon, and this in itself might 
be a great waste „ In the second place, negotiation may not produce a 
price which is equitable or realistic, because the divisions may not be 
in equal bargaining positions„ The absence of outside sales markets or 
purchase opportunities would complicate the establishing of an equitable 
transfer price. Therefore, some method of arbitration to quickly 
solve the disputes that arise, and a system to insure equitable trans­
fer prices must necessarily be considered before adopting this method0 
Cost-based Prices 
Gost can also be used as a basis for pricing intra-company 
transfers. Where this is the case, costs used are defined in a variety 
of ways to fit the purpose management wants to accomplish,, Full cost, 
marginal cost and cost plus will be discussed. 
Mien full cost is used as a transfer price it includes all the 
costs associated with producing the product, including allocated general 
administration, research, and advertising expenses charged to the di­
vision by the central office. In most cases, full cost should be a 
standard or predetermined cost. If it is not, the manufacturing divi­
sion will have no incentive to control costs, for recovery is assured 
in the transfer price. If an appropriate and accurate standard cost is 
used, inefficiencies will have to be accounted for by the manufacturing 
division,,^ 
Where fall cost is used, the transfer price equals the costj and 
the operating unit can not be evaluated as a profit center because there 
•^Knighton, 0£«> cito» p. 11» ^Anthony, og. eit., p» 260„ 
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is no profit included in the transfer price. There are two situations 
tfhere a transfer price which equals cost may be useful. One case is 
when transfers between units are so insignificant that cost, the simplest 
method of accounting for such transfers, is used. The other situation 
is when it is not practical to evaluate the operating unit as a profit 
center, because it does not lend itself to profit calculation or evalu-
17 
ation® A good example is a research and development department 
It might also be beneficial to base the transfer price on marginal 
or incremental costs, when idle capacity exists0 This method is a short-
run pricing technique, because products are sold at prices with return 
something less than a full share of fixed cost^® But in this case also 
the operating unit can not be evaluated as a profit center. 
When cost plus a fair return is used as a transfer price, an 
amount is added to cost to provide a profit for the product transferred„ 
The cost, as mentioned above, should be standard cost, because by using 
it there will be an incentive to control costs« In order to provide an 
incentive to reduce costs, there should be a mechanism to insure that 
the manufacturing division will benefit from new methods which improve 
efficiency. One solution will be to leave the standard cost unchanged 
19 
for a period of time after the new method for reducing costs is in use.. 
Consequently, by reducing its cost, the manufacturing division increases 
its profit, during the period of time the standard cost is left unchanged,, 
^William Lo Felix, Jr0, "Intracorspany Pricing," (unpublished 
Master's thesis, University of Montana, Missoula, 1965) > p° 11« 
^National Association of Cost Accountants, o£<, cit.» p„ 36„ 
•^Anthony, ioc<, cite 
18 
Without these incentives to control and reduce costs, the cost 
plus method will be of little value in setting a transfer price, because 
the buying division will not be evaluated independently of the selling 
division. In other words, part of the buying division's profit perform­
ance will be based on how efficient the manufacturing division is in 
producing the product. 
III. SMART 
After consideration of the objectives of top management in a de­
centralized company, two areas were examined, (1) how these objectives 
can be met through the use of divisional profit performance, and (2) 
transfer pricing methods used in calculating divisional profit. Through­
out the chapter an attempt has been made to show that the measurement of 
profit, along with the determination of transfer prices, is a function 
of only the objectives of the decentralized organization. 
CHAPTER III 
EXAMINATION OP A CONTROL SYSTEM 
As previously stated, part of this study was devoted to investi­
gation of the application of transfer pricing in a specific organization. 
The purpose of this chapter will be to describe the organization by 
examining (1) its'structure and circumstances within which it operates, 
(2) the present control system, and (3) the inadequacy of the present 
control system. 
I* SETTING OF THE CASE 
The ABC Company is engaged in diversified operations within the 
forest products industry. It manufactures and sells many grades and 
species of lumber and other related products. Like most companies in 
the industry, growth has been accomplished through integration. This 
company has production facilities for procuring the treesj sawing these 
trees into rough green stock j finishing (drying and planing) the rough 
green stockj and producing various wood products, such as mouldings and 
lath. Most of these functions are grouped into smaller organizational 
units in the company (divisionalization), and therefore, raw materials 
and products are being transferred from one operating unit to another 
for farther processing. 
The ABC Company has no forest land of its own, and therefore is 
greatly dependent on federal timber offerings. But this problem is 
alleviated somewhat, because the sawmills of this company are located 
19 
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in different areas? this makes available more federal timber sales» 
This study was limited to one operating unit of the company—a 
sawmill. This particular sawmill is located in an area in which pon-
derosa pine is prevalent, and -therefore it saws mainly this species. 
The rough green stock from this mill is transferred to another location, 
where it is mixed with stock from other sawmills and finished. This 
stock is presently transferred at cost, because there is no competitive 
market price for green lumber of this species. Certain species of rough 
green stock do have market prices, but when pine is in this stage it 
can not be readily used for anything, so no market price exists. 
II. PRESENT CONTROL SYSTEM 
The present control system of this particular sawmill is based 
on the expenses incurred to produce the rough green stock, and for this 
reason we shall call it an expense center. The characteristics of this 
expense center ares 
1. It is a separate coordinated work group in the production 
process. 
2. It is large enough to give sufficient cost detail. 
3. Authority has been delegated to a manager who is responsible 
for costs and coordinating the activities of the center. 
It should be emphasized that decentralization is present in this 
sawmill. Top management has delegated authority to the sawmill manager, 
and he becomes the key figure in the control system., The manager has 
authority over the resources used in producing the rough green stock, 
namely, men, materials, and machinery and facilities» A discussion of 
each of these will be presented in the following paragraphs. 
21 
The manager has fall control over the number of hourly personnel 
employed. If he feels additional laborers are needed to make his oper­
ation more efficient, he has fall authority to employ them. Supervisory 
personnel are in some cases placed in the mill by top management, but 
these situations are discussed with the manager beforehand. 
Although the manager does not have complete control over the 
prices paid for the logs sawed in the mill, he does have a considerable 
amount of influence in this area. Mien timber is up for bids, the man­
ager accompanies the company buyers and together they bid on the timber. 
All other materials used in the production process are under the com­
plete control of the sawmill manager. 
In the area of machinery and facilities, the manager serves as 
the initiating factor. Every six months, he makes out a capital budget­
ing report which is submitted to the general manager of the company. 
In this report the manager states what expenditures he feels are neces­
sary to improve operations. The general manager reviews this report 
and decides which investments are reasonable. If he cannot justify a 
certain investment, the manager is told why it was rejected. If the 
sawmill manager is still not satisfied, he can resubmit it at a later 
date with a more thorough analysis. Reports on how well the new invest­
ments are doing are kept by the sawmill manager and reviewed by the 
general manager. Although there is no well established cut-off point, 
the manager does have authority to make small investment decisions 
without home office approval. 
Top management realizes that in delegating to the manager author­
ity over a segment of the operations, it must measure accurately what 
the manager spends and review and appraise his expenditures. At the end 
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of each month, expenses are totaled and evaluated by the general manager„ 
Mo standard, such as a budget, is used in which a manager mast operate, 
or by which he is evaluated. Instead, past monthly operating statements 
of his and other company mills are used for comparison. Some major ex­
pense areas of other sawmills are very similar to this particular sawmill, 
and for this reason can be used for comparison. If any area seems to be 
out of line, the general manager questions and discusses the trouble 
spot with the sawmill manager so that corrective action can be taken, 
if necessary. 
In summary, the benefits which top management feels are achieved 
in this expense center ares 
1. Cost information is compiled on a monthly basis so that the 
manager can take corrective action in the event of trouble 
areas. 
2. Cost information is made available for top management use in 
controlling and planning the operation of the sawmill. 
3. Expenses are related to the person responsible for control­
ling them. Therefore, the manager is made cost conscious, 
and will in most cases use the resources in the most effi­
cient way. 
III. INADEQUACY OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM 
The performance of an operating unit may be measured in terms of 
its effectiveness and efficiency. Effectiveness relates to how well the 
operating unit performs in relationship to the organization's goals 
(such as profit), whereas efficiency is the amount of output per unit 
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of input, which is usually compared to some standard. An important 
fact in the relationship between these two measures is that two oper­
ating units can both have the same efficiency, but are not equally as 
effective, as one unit may be producing more profit than the other (an 
illustration will be provided below). 
The present control system in the sawmill examined in this study 
is based on expenses incurred. Effectiveness cannot be measured in 
financial terms in an expense center, because no attempt is made to 
measure the value of the output. Therefore, the sawmill is evaluated 
on its efficiency, that is, how well its current operating expenses com­
pare to its own and other company sawmills' past operating expenses. 
Top management does not feel this is adequate, and they would like to 
develop a system of information (control system) which measures both 
effectiveness and efficiency. If the sawmill could be changed to a 
profit center, management's objective might be achieved. 
To further explain the objective of profit measurement in this 
sawmill, an example is presented in Illustration 1„ 
Illustration 1. Measurement of Effectiveness and Efficiency. 
Sawmill A Sawmill B 
Revenue $ 9,000 $10,000 
Cost 6,000 6,000 
Profit $ 3,000 $ U,000 
No. of 1,000 bd. ft. 2,000 2,000 
Cost per 1,000 bd. ft. $ 3.00 $ 3.00 
Profit per 1,000 bd. ft. 1.50 2.00 
•'•Robert N. Anthony, "Note on Responsibility Centers," Management 
Control Systems, Robert N. Anthony, John Dearden, and Richard P. 7ancil, 
editors (Homewood, 111.; Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965), p. 168. 
Assume that both sawmills have the same investment and are operating at 
capacity. Suppose the company is planning on expanding one of these 
mills. If the performance of the sawmills is measured in terms of effi­
ciency (cost per 1,000 bd. ft.) alone, the company would not be able to 
decide in which mill to invest, because both sawmills are operating with 
the same efficiency ($3). However, if the performance of the sawmills 
is measured by a profit center system, Sawmill B would be the logical 
mill in which to invest. Sawmill B is more effective, for it is produc­
ing more profit per 1,000 board feet ($2), in comparison to Sawmill A 
($1.50). Profit, because it is related to and measures both effective­
ness and efficiency, would serve as a guide in allocating future resources 
between these sawmills. 
The real difference between the two sawmills in the illustration 
is that Sawmill B received more revenue for its product. Assume that the 
extra revenue Sawmill B received was due to the higher quality logs sawed 
in this mill. It might be said, that on the average each sawmill would 
be paying more for higher quality timber, and therefore the profit per 
1,000 board feet for each sawmill would on the average be the same. 
However, this is not always the case, since federal timber sales are 
sold through a competitive bidding system, and where there are very few 
bidders, the sale price does not always reflect the quality of the tim­
ber which is sold. 
Where only one sawmill transfers its stock to a finishing unit 
it would not be necessary to know how much profit the sawmill produces. 
Such a sawmill could operate as a department or expense center within 
the finishing unit, as the profit of the sawmill would be directly 
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correlated with that of the finishing unit. Bat in the ABC Company, 
there is a situation where raore than one sawmill transfers its stock to 
a finishing division. This stock is mixed, due to order demands, which 
makes it impossible to correlate the profit of the finishing division 
with each individual sawmill. These sawmills are presently using ex­
pense center systems. The ABC Company would like to maintain their 
measure of efficiency, and in addition, desires to determine the ef­
fectiveness, or profit, of each mill, as a guide for future resource 
allocation among these mills. Consequently, a profit center system is 
deemed necessary. 
The particular sawmill being examined in this study is of special 
interest, in that the profit of this sawmill will probably be the most 
difficult to measure as compared to the other mills. As mentioned 
earlier, this sawmill saws mainly ponderosa pine, which in its rough 
green form has no established market price. 
CHAPTER I? 
INVESTIGATING A POSSIBLE TRANSFER PRICING METHOD 
The present transfer pricing method used to transfer rough green 
stock, from the particular sawmill being examined, to a finishing divi­
sion of the ABC Company is cost. Under this method the sawmill can not 
be evaluated as a profit center. In order for profit to serve as a guide 
in future sawmill resource allocation (objective of profit decentraliza­
tion), it will be necessary to consider transfer pricing methods which 
include profit in the transfer price. This chapter is devoted to in­
vestigating the feasibility of a competitive transfer pricing system, 
but first, some characteristics of this proposed profit center will be 
examined. 
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PROPOSED PROFIT CENTER 
The area the sawmill is located in has some effect on the profit 
of the mill. A mill which is located in an area where there are very 
few other mills, and therefore probably very few bidders on federal 
timber sales, might be able to buy timber at a price which does not 
always reflect the quality of timber which is being sold. The sawmill 
manager would not have control over the number of other mills located 
in his areaj consequently, he could not be held completely responsible 
for the profit of the mill. This characteristic would need to be con­
sidered when home office management evaluates the sawmill manager. 
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The freedom for this proposed profit center to make sales outside 
the company would be limited, because it will probably not hare an al­
ternative market for its stock. This situation is caused by a high 
degree of integration in the forest products industry. Today, many 
companies have their own sawmills which fulfill their needed quota of 
rough green stockj consequently, they do not need to purchase rough 
green stock from other companies. 
Home office management does not allocate general overhead to the 
operating unitsj therefor, this would not be considered in the measure­
ment of income of the proposed profit center. Probably the most diffi­
cult problem in income measurement, as mentioned in Chapter II, is 
establishing a competitive transfer price. Market based, cost plus a 
fair return, and negotiated prices are transfer prices which include 
profit, and for this reason will be discussed. A market-based method 
seems to be the only workable solution to this problem, although the 
other methods will be discussed to show their shortcomings. 
II. POSSIBLE TRANSFER PRICING METHOD 
Market prices for the rough green stock can probably be estimated 
by subtracting from the price of the finished lumber those casts (and 
profits) added after the logs have reached their rough green form. In 
this particular case, other factors will necessarily have to be consid­
ered, and because information on these factors was not available at the 
time of this study, a round-about approach was taken in setting the 
transfer prices. This procedure is somewhat different than the pro­
cedure which could be used if the needed information was available and 
which will be presented later,, 
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In the round-about approach for setting transfer prices, the data 
for a recent month of the sawmill was examined, along with the data at 
the other sawmills transferring their stock to the same finishing divi­
sion. Only the data for the particular sawmill examined in this study 
is presented in full detail. During this month, the finishing division 
received all the profit for the applicable sawmills, because the mills 
transferred their stock at cost. The profit the finishing division made 
on this stock can only be estimated at around $32,000, because it did 
not sell this stock during the month. In the procedure used in this 
study, this profit is allocated to where it was made (i.e., among both 
the sawmills and the finishing division), by using transfer prices which 
include profit. In order to accomplish this, certain information which 
was needed and not available had to be estimated, so that the total of 
the allocated profit would be close to $32,000. The procedure and re­
sults are presented in Table 1.^ Only the sawmills need to follow the 
procedure presented in Table I to arrive at their allocated profit. The 
finishing division's allocated profit will be available from the pro­
cedure followed by the sawmills, for reasons which will be more apparent 
later. 
Columns A through M of the illustration are based on the differ­
ent classifications of lumber sawed in each mill. For instance, column 
A is the number of 1,000 board feet of each classification sawed in the 
sawmills during the month. These classifications may include as many as 
four or five grades. The reason the rough green stock is placed in such 
•'•Some of the procedure used in this approach was formed by the 
Accounting Manager of the ABC Company. 
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TABLE I 
PROCEDURE AND RESULTS OF MARKET-BASED TRANSFER PRICING 
METHOD USED IN THIS STUDY 
(1,000 bd„ ft.) 
A  B C D  E  F  
No. of * Average Gross Net Sales Finishing Total 
1,000 b.f. Finished Sales (After Cost Finishing 
according Price 1.2% Plus Cost 
to classi­ over discount) Profit (inc. 
fication Month profit) 
or grade (AxB) (AxE) 
at sawmill $ $ $ $ $ 
Sawmill #1 
P.Pines 
k/k Select 83-5 162.11 13,536 12,561 20.1|3 1,706 
6/h Shop 271.3 95.12 25,803 23,91*5 19.15 5,193 
h/h Common 50.3 67.80 3,1*10 3,161* 20»lt3 1,026 
6/k Common 1*73.1* 81.55 38,605 35,825 20.29 9,603 
Timbers 15.8 75.00 1,185 1,100 9.6 9 153 
Spruces 
28,206 h/h 381.7 79.63 30,395 19 c 66 7,501* 
3/6 310.1 88.75 27,521 25,539 18.58 5,762 
White Fir: 
1*A lit.3 50.00 715 661* 22.1*7 321 
8A 135.8 62.35 8,1*67 7,857 ll*.25 1,935 
Sub-total 1,736.3 11*9,638 138,861 33,203 
Sawmill #2 
Sub-total 3,715-9 312,808 290,281 63,236 
Sawmill #3 
Sub-total 1,180.1* 75,089 69,681 16,306 
TOTAL 6,632.5 
(Continued) 
Table I. (Continued) 
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G H I J K L M 
Rough Green Loss Total Degrad­- Total Rough Rough 
Stock Reve­ Due to Loss due ing Degrad- Green Green 
nue Before Break­ to Factor ing Stock Stock 
Breakage & age Breakage Factor Revenue Price 
Degrading (AxH) (AxJ) (G-(I+K)) (L«A) 
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ 
Sawmill #1 
P.Pines 
1*/l* Select 10,855 6.51 51*3 3.90 326 9,986 119.60 
6/h Shop 18,752 3.1*5 938 2.07 563 17,251 63.59 
I4./U Common 2,138 2.12 107 2.12 107 1,967 39.11 
6/1* Common 26,222 2.76 1,311 2.76 1,311 21*, 121* 50.96 
Timber 91*7 2.97 1*7 1»77 28 872 55«19 
Spruces 
1*A 20,702 2.71 1,035 2.71 1,035 19,01*6 1*9.90 
3/6 19,777 3.28 98 9 3.28 989 18,195 58.67 
White Firs 
h/k 31*3 1.18 17 1.18 17 309 21.61 
8/1* 5,922 2.17 296 2.17 296 5,330 39,25 
Sub-total 105,658 5,283 1*,672 95,703 
Sawmill #2 
Sub-total 227,01*5 15,893 16,51*3 191*, 609 
Sawmill #3 
Sub-total 53,375 2,587 1,600 1*9,188 
Sawmill #1 Sawmill #2 Sawmill #3 TOTAL 
Revenue $ 95,703 $191*,605 $ 1*9,188 
Operating Cost 91,611 l8l,lUt5 1*7,688 
Profit $ 1*,092 $ 13,160 $ 1,500 $18,752 
Finishing Division 
No. of 1,000 bd. ft. 6,632.5 
Profit per 1,000 bd. ft. $ 2.00 
Profit $ 13,265 13,265 
/ 
$32,017 
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broad categories, is that it is very hard to determine the final grade 
of lumber when it is in its rough green form. By employing another 
grader on each work shift it would be possible to grade this stock into 
more categories, but still the grade given the stock at this state would 
not be completely accurate for reasons discussed later. 
Column B represents the average finished price over the month for 
each classification. This required averaging together the lumber prices 
for each grade within the classification. Finished lumber prices fluc­
tuate widely, and consequently each grade price was also only an average. 
Column C is the gross sales value of eaeh classification. It is deter­
mined by multiplying the number of 1,000 board feet times the average 
price. Column D is the net sales value for each classification. This 
is derived by subtracting the discount (7.2%) given the buyers from 
the gross sales. 
Column E represents the finishing cost plus profit for eaeh 1,000 
board feet. The finishing cost for each classification can be determined 
quite accurately by the fijntsMnj^&s^fsien,, The profit added to the 
finishing cost was a fixed profit ($2.00 per 1,000 bd. ft.), as just 
about all classifications go through the same finishing process„ Column 
F is the total finishing cost (including profit) for each class if icatiom 
This is determined by multiplying the number of 1,000 board feet times 
the finishing cost plus profit. 
Column G represents the rough green stock revenue before breakage 
and degrading for each classification. It is derived by subtracting the 
total finishing cost plus profit from the net sales value. 
Column H is the loss due to breakage for each classification. 
Some of the rough green stock is broken in the finishing process. 
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Consequently, the transfer prices of each 1,000 board feet would have to 
reflect this loss, which is due to the nature of the product, and accord­
ingly should be reduced. Column I is the total loss due to breakage for 
each classification. This is determined by multiplying the number of 
1,000 board feet times the loss due to breakage. 
Column J is the degrading factor for each classification. Degrad­
ing is the monetary loss suffered due to the development of defects on 
the rough green stock in the finishing process. Although this problem 
can be recognized, it is impossible to eliminate, as many of these de-
facts cannot be seen on the rough green stock. For example, defects will 
develop on some of the stock which was originally classified as k/h sel­
ect, and consequently, this stock will have to be reclassified as h/h 
common, and sold at a lower price. Column K is the total degrading 
factor per number of 1,000 board feet. This is derived by multiplying 
the number of board feet in each classification times the degrading 
factor. 
It should be mentioned that both the loss due to breakage and the 
degrading factor had to be estimated for each classification, as the 
values for these factors were not available. This is the reason why it 
was necessary to use the round-about way to estimate the transfer prices. 
In order to determine what these values would actually be, it would be 
necessary to follow samples of each classification of stock through the 
finishing process. In most cases, these classifications will have dif­
ferent values, and will probably vary in each mill0 When these values 
are known, a much easier procedure can be used to estimate the transfer 
prices. This procedure will be presented later. 
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Column L in the illustration is the rough green stock revenue for 
each classification. It is determined by adding the total loss due to 
breakage to the total degrading factor, and subtracting this value from 
the rough green stock revenue before breakage and degrading. 
Column M is the transfer price for each category. It is derived 
by dividing the rough green stock revenue by the number of 1,000 board 
feet. 
The profit figures for each sawmill can be obtained by subtract­
ing their operating cost from their rough green stock revenue (column L). 
The operating cost for each sawmill during the month was, respectively, 
$91,611, $l8l,lil*f>j and $1i7,688. The respective profit for each mill 
would then be $h,092, $13,160, and $1,^00. The finishing division, as 
mentioned earlier would make $2.00 per 1,000 board feet, and therefore, 
its profit would be $13,266. These four profit figures total to be 
$32,017, which is very close to the estimate of what the profit would 
have actually been ($32,000), if the finishing division sold only the 
stock which was transferred during the month. 
"When the values for the loss due to breakage and degrading factors 
are established, a much simpler and somewhat different procedure than the 
one used in this study can be used to estimate the transfer prices. This 
procedure is presented in Table II, along with a set of figures taken 
from Table I, which serves as an example. 
Finished lumber prices fluctuate widely, and for this reason must 
be stabilized on a monthly or at least quarterly basis„ Weekly average 
prices for each classification are made by the Western Wood Products 
Association, and these could be used to arrive at a monthly average. 
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TABLE II 
MARKET-BASED TRANSFER PRICING METHOD 
A B G D E F G 
Lumber Average Met Sales Finishing Rough Green Loss Degrad- Rough 
Glassif- Finished Price Cost Stock Price Due to ing Green 
ications Price (After Plus Before Break- Factor Stock 
Over 1.2% Profit Breakage & age Price 
Month discount) Degrading C-(D+E) 
3* q> *p «p tfi <p 
h/k Sel. 162.11 l^O.Uli 20oit3 130o01 6.$1 3.90 119.60 
Consequently, the prices the sawmill could receive on its rough green 
stock would not be determined until the end of each month. 
The sawmill manager would be required to ship its rough green 
stock as soon as it was finished. If this were not the case, the sawmill 
manager would be trying to maximize his profit by making transfers when 
he thought the price would be high, and the finishing division manager 
would be trying to maximize his profit by buying when he thought the 
price would be low. This would not be in the best interest of the com­
pany, as in some instances finished lumber which was needed to meet order 
demands might not be available. 
The procedure in Table II would be followed each month. Values 
for the loss due to breakage and degrading factor would probably only 
need to be changed when each sawmill began sawing logs from a new federal 
timber sale. The profit the mills would make each month would be put in 
terms of the number of 1,000 board feet sawed. This would give the three 
sawmills a comparable measure, which over a period of time could be used 
as a guide in future resource allocation,, 
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At this point, it should be mentioned that if this system is used, 
it would probably be beneficial to grade the stock into more categories, 
rather than continuing with the present broad ones, especially if there 
is a big difference between the prices of the grades in each category. 
For example, a sawmill which transferred a great deal of high grade k/k 
common would receive only the average price over all grades of k/h common 
for this stock, if this present category was used, and this would not 
reflect the quality of the logs coming from this sawmill. To grade the 
rough green stock into more categories would take more time, and conse­
quently, another grader would have to be employed on each work shift. 
It was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that the defi­
ciencies of the cost plus a fair return and negotiated transfer prices 
would be discussed. In the cost plus a fair return, it would still be 
necessary to establish the loss due to breakage and the degrading factor 
for each classification. Also, it would be necessary to attach to the 
different classifications of rough green stock, different profit mark­
ups. Presumably, these profit mark-ups would stay constant for each 
classification, and in this case, this method would not recognize the 
actual price fluctuations which occur on the finished lumber, and in­
herently on the rough green stock. Consequently, this method would dis­
tort the profit performance of this sawmill. 
Negotiated pricing would probably also distort the profit per­
formance of this sawmill. It was mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter that the forest products industry is highly integrated. For 
this reason, the sawmill and finishing division would probably have no 
one else to negotiate with, for the sale or purchase of rough green 
36 
stock. In this case, the transfer prices set might be biased toward 
the operating unit with the most bargaining power. Also, it would still 
be necessary to establish the loss due to breakage and degrading factor 
for each stock classification. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
As business organizations have increased in size, the central­
ized functional-type organization structure has been replaced in many 
instances by divisionalization and decentralization. In these organ­
izations, an information system is needed to provide control over the 
separate operating units. The profit center system has gained increased 
attention in recent years for two reasons? 
1. Profit measures both efficiency and effectiveness. 
2. Profit measurement can now be accomplished in many different 
situations, by using the relatively new concept of transfer 
pricing, whereas in the past it seemed impossible if compe­
titive market prices did not exist. 
The profit center system is being considered by the ABC Company 
for these two reasons. The objective of profit measurement in the saw­
mill is to measure its effectiveness, and to accomplish this objective, 
transfer prices which include profit sere required. Naturally, transfer 
prices need not be completely accurate, for when they are applied to 
improve management control, the desired result can still be obtained as 
long as they reasonably approximate market prices. Transfer prices 
which include profit happen to be particularly hard to arrive at in the 
case of this industry. A market-based pricing method seems to be the 
feasible solution to the problem. 
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In conclusion, it will be necessary to evaluate this transfer 
pricing method and profit center system, in terras of the costs required 
to implement and use such a system, versus the return it gives of better 
control. The major costs which must be considered ares (1) hiring 
another grader on each work shift, which would enable the rough green 
stock to be classified into more categories, and (2) following the rough 
green stock through the finishing process to determine the degrading and 
loss due to breakage factors. The return this profit center would give 
would provide better control over the allocation of future resources 
among the sawmills. 
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